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Contingent Existence and Iterated Modality
CIAN DORR
Boris Kment’s Modality and Explanatory Reasoning is a rich and rewarding book.  Along the 
way to his  conclusions about the cognitive function of modal concepts and their relation to ex-
planation, Kment presents many ideas which are of great independent interest.  One example is in 
chapters 4 and 5, where Kment develops an admirably rigorous theory of worlds as classes of 
propositions (proper classes, in the case of metaphysically possible worlds).  The most distinctive 
features of this theory stem from contingentism, the view that some things could have failed to 
exist, in the sense that there could have been nothing identical to them.  According to Kment, 
propositions about contingent existents are themselves contingent, and thus worlds, as classes of 
propositions, end up being contingent as well.   
So far Kment agrees with many other authors, including Adams (1981) and Stalnaker (2012). 
But there is one important point on which Kment agrees with Adams and disagrees with most 
other authors who have considered these questions.  According to him, one upshot of all this con-
tingency is that we have reject certain widely-accepted principles of propositional modal logic 
involving iterated modal operators.  Abbreviating ‘it is metaphysically necessary that φ’ as ‘□φ’ 








On their view, given that Obama is a contingent existent, (1–3) are false if we substitute ‘Obama 
is president’ for φ; (1–4) are false if we substitute ‘It is not the case that Obama is president’; and 
all five are false if we substitute ‘Either Obama is president or it is not the case that Obama is 
president’.  Even though these claims are not particularly crucial to Kment’s larger program, they 
are quite striking and have broad ramifications for the current debate about contingentism (Willi-
amson 2013).  The main goal of this paper is to identify and evaluate Adams’s and Kment’s ar-
guments against schemas like (1–5).  At the end I will briefly argue against their view.    
The immediate source of Adams’s and Kment’s rejection of (1–5) is their acceptance of what 
I will call 
Adams’s Schema (a) □∀x□(□φ(x) → x exists) 
   (b) □∀x□(◇φ(x) → x exists) 
Adams would accept every sentence that results from (a) or (b) by replacing ‘φ(x)’ with any sen-
tence in which the variable x occurs free, and I believe Kment would too.  But to motivate reject-
ing (1–5) we only need instances where φ(x) is an atomic sentence involving x, or a truth-func-
tional compound of such sentences.   For example, the instance of (b) where ‘φ(x)’ is ‘x is pres-
ident’ implies that necessarily, if it is possible that Obama is president, then Obama exists.  Giv-
en that it is not necessary that Obama exists, we can conclude from this that it is not necessarily 
possible that Obama is president, so that we have a counterexample to (1).   Counterexamples to 1
(2–4) can be extracted by similar reasoning from other simple instances of Adams’s Schema.   
But why are we supposed to accept Adams’s Schema?  One argument which one might be 
tempted to attribute to Kment turns on the idea that propositions cannot have properties, includ-
ing modal properties, without existing.  Abbreviating ‘the proposition that φ’ as ‘[φ]’, we can 
state the key premises of this argument as follows: 
Mentioning Schema: For all x, [φ(x)] mentions x (at least where φ(x) is a truth-functional com-
pound of atomic sentences involving x).   
 This reasoning turns on the K schema □(φ→ψ)→(□φ→□ψ), which is not threatened by the Adams-Kment view.1
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Dependence: If a proposition p mentions an entity x, □(if p exists, x exists). 
Instantiation Requires Existence (IRE): For any entity x and property f, [x has f] logically en-
tails [x exists] (Kment 2014: 78). 
Atomic Operators: if p = [φ], then [□φ] = [p has necessity] and [◇φ] = [p has possibility].  
Necessity Schema: □φ ↔ [φ] is necessary.  2
Some explanation is required.  Kent identifies propositions with “Lagadonian sentences”: certain 
sets (or proper classes), thought of as sentences in a language where everything can serve as a 
name of itself, and every property or relation can also serve as a predicate expressing itself.  The 
entities “mentioned” by a proposition are the entities that occur in it as names or predicates. 
Since all entities mentioned by a proposition belong to its transitive closure, Dependence falls 
out of the thesis that a class cannot exist unless each of its members exists.  3
It is because propositions have this sentence-like structure that it makes sense to speak, as 
IRE does, of “logical entailment” among propositions.  Like familiar relations of logical con-
sequence among sentences of formal languages, the question whether p logically entails q de-
pends only on the “logical forms” of p and q, not on which particular entities they mention.  We 
can express this idea more precisely by introducing a notion of substitution for propositions. 
When f is a function such that f(r) is an n-ary relation whenever r is an n-ary relation, it is integ-
ral to Kment’s theory of propositions that for any proposition p, there is a unique proposition – 
call it the “f-image” of p – that results from p by replacing every occurrence in p of an entity x in 
the domain of f (playing the role of a name for itself or non-logical predicate expressing itself) 
 One could derive the Necessity Schema from Atomic Operators together with the Truth Schema, ‘[φ] is true ↔ φ’. 2
When ‘F’ is a simple adjective expressing a property, Kment identifies [p is F] with [p has F-ness] – so in particular, 
[p is necessary] = [p has necessity].  Atomic Operators thus implies that when q=[φ], [q is necessary]=[□φ]. 
Hence [q is necessary] is true iﬀ [□φ] is true, which implies by the Truth Schema that q is necessary iﬀ □φ.  How-
ever, the reasons for Kment to accept the Necessity Schema, and the analogous Possibility Schema (‘◇φ ↔ [φ] is 
possible’), look much stronger than the reasons to accept Atomic Operators.
 In fact the situation is slightly more complicated: Kment uses a coding trick to allow that proper classes can be 3
mentioned despite not being members of anything.  However, the proper classes mentioned by a proposition are all 
subclasses of its transitive closure, so we can still derive Dependence from the premise that a class cannot exist 
without any of its members or subclasses.  
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with a corresponding occurrence of f(x).  The “formal” character of logical entailment can then 
expressed as follows: whenever pp logically entail q, the f-images of pp logically entail the f-im-
age of q for any bijection f.  Many cases of necessitation thus fail to be cases of logical entail-
ment: for example, if f is the conjunction of two properties g and h distinct from itself, [a has f → 
a has g] will be necessary, although [a has f] does not logically entail [a has g].  But according to 
Kment, every case of logical entailment is a case of necessitation: if p logically entails q, the ma-
terial conditional whose antecedent is p and whose consequent is q is necessary.  Given this thes-
is, IRE and Atomic Operators jointly imply that when p = [φ(x)], the material conditionals 
[□φ(x) → p exists] and [◇φ(x) → p exists] are both necessary.  So by the Necessity Schema, 
□(□φ(x) → p exists) and □(◇φ(x) → p exists).  But from the Mentioning Schema and De-
pendence, we know that □(p exists → x exists).  So we can conclude that □(□φ(x) → x exists) 
and □(◇φ(x) → x exists), using uncontroversial modal reasoning.   
However, on reflection I doubt this argument captures Kment’s actual motivation for Adams’s 
Schema, since given his fine-grained theory of propositions, it would be quite surprising if he 
accepted Atomic Operators. To get a feel for the fine-grainedness of the view, consider that 
Kment would take all three of the following to be distinct: 
v1: [a is a female fox] 
v2: [a has f], where f=the property of being a female fox 
v3: [a has the property of being a female fox] 
Only v2 is a subject-predicate proposition of the kind to which IRE applies.  v1, unlike v2, does 4
not mention the property of being a female fox (a.k.a. the property of being a vixen).  v3 is some-
thing diﬀerent again.  On Kment’s view, when ‘is F’ is syntactically complex, ‘the property of 
being F’ functions like the definite description ‘the unique property to which it is essential that 
all and only the F things have it’ (Kment 2013: 154).  v3 will thus come apart from v2 at logically 
 Kment would identify v2 with [a is a vixen].4
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possible worlds at which some other property uniquely satisfies this description; it will come 
apart from v1 at logically possible worlds at which no property satisfies the description.   
Making these fine distinctions in the case of ‘the property of being F’ suggests that similar 
distinctions are called for in the case of ‘the proposition that φ’. For example, the considerations 
that lead Kment to distinguish v2 from v3 also seem to require distinguishing o1 from o2: 
o1: [p is possible], where p=[Obama is president].   
o2: [[Obama is president] is possible].   
o1 is a subject-predicate proposition that mentions [Obama is president] and possibility, but not 
Obama.  By analogy with v3, I think Kment should say that o2 is a diﬀerent proposition, which 
does not mention [Obama is president], but rather picks it out descriptively in terms of some rela-
tions it bears to Obama and being president.  For example, if Kment identified [Obama is presid-
ent] with the ordered pair <being president, Obama>, he might identify o2 with [the ordered pair 
whose first element is being president and whose second element is Obama is possible].  
But if o1 and o2 are distinct, there is no obvious reason to follow Atomic Operators in identi-
fying o1 with [◇(Obama is president)] – call this proposition o*.  Indeed, o2 looks like a better 
candidate to be o*, since this would allow Kment to accept the Mentioning Schema in full gener-
ality, whereas Atomic Operators requires restricting it to φ(x) not involving modal operators.   
While this blocks the argument for Adams’s Schema based on IRE, identifying o* with o2 
would open up the possibility of a diﬀerent argument for Adams’s Schema based on a diﬀerent 
principle closely related to IRE.  Suppose for example that Kment went along with the sugges-
tion that o* = o2 = [the ordered pair whose first element is being president and whose second 
element is Obama is possible], and furthermore adopted a Russellian theory of descriptions on 
which this proposition is in turn identical to [∃x(OrderedPair(x) ∧ FirstElement(being 
president,x) ∧ SecondElement(Obama, x) ∧ Possible(x) ∧ ∀y((OrderedPair(x) ∧ 
FirstElement(being president, x) ∧ SecondElement(Obama, x)) ⊃ y=x)] (where the predications 
here are all atomic).  Given that Kment regards free logic as a good guide to the logical entail-
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m e n t r e l a t i o n a m o n g p r o p o s i t i o n s , t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n l o g i c a l l y e n t a i l s 
[∃x(SecondElement(Obama, x))]. And although IRE says nothing about this proposition (since it 
is not atomic), the motivation for IRE plausibly extends to existential quantifications of atomic 
propositions: 
IRE+: For any entity x and n-ary relation r, [∃y1…∃yn–1(r applies to y1,…,yn-1,x)] logically en-
tails [x exists].  (Cf. principle (C4) in Adams 1981).   
Thus, given assumptions in the spirit of his project, Kment could argue for the relevant instance 
of Adams’s Schema from the premise that o*  =  o2.  And there are other candidates to be o* 
which would serve equally well for this purpose.  For example, an argument from IRE+ could 
still be run if one identified o* with o3 rather than o2: 
o3:  [[Obama is president] is true at some world in the sphere around the actualized world that 
contains all and only those worlds that match the actualized world with respect to the 
metaphysical laws]. 
o3 would be a natural candidate for Kment to consider, since he holds that possibility is being 
true at some world in the unique sphere around the actualized world that contains all and only 
those worlds that match the actualized world with respect to the metaphysical laws. o3 thus 
stands to o2 much as v2 stands to v1; if it is true, its truth grounds the truth of o2. 
Still, why should o* be identified with any of these candidates?  Kment is certainly not com-
mitted to a general program of identifying all propositions expressed using sentential operators 
with propositions about the properties of and relations among propositions.  Consider [it is not 
the case that Obama is president] – call it n.  Kment certainly does not think that n =  [p has 
falsehood], where p =  [Obama is president], or that n =  [[Obama is president] has falsehood]. 
Both of those propositions necessitate [Obama exists], whereas n does not: the material condi-
tional with n as antecedent and [Obama exists] as consequent is false at possible worlds where 
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Obama is never born.  If the negation operator gets to work like this, why shouldn’t modal oper-
ators get the same privilege?   
Against the background of a theory of propositions as fine-grained as Kment’s, claims of the 
form [φ]=[ψ] are hard to argue for when φ and ψ are not syntactically isomorphic; one will face 
an uphill battle if one’s strategy for arguing for Adams’s Schema depends such controversial 
identifications.  However, Adams’s original paper also suggests a diﬀerent argument for some 
controversial instances of Adams’s Schema which requires no assumptions of this sort.  Its key 
premise, in Adams’s formulation, is that  
…what is true about me at a world in which I do not exist must be determined, in accordance 
with some logical criterion, by the proposition that I do not exist, together with other propos-
itions, true at that world, which are not about me (Adams 1981, 23).   
This corresponds the following key assumption of Kment’s system: 
Supervenience*. For any propositions pp, if (i) for every x, pp logically entail either [x exists] 
or [x doesn’t exist] and (ii) every proposition that only mentions objects x such that pp lo-
gically entail [x exists] is such that pp either logically entail it or its negation, then pp lo-
gically entail every proposition or its negation.  (Kment 2013, 135). 
Loosely following Adams (1981, 32), let’s see how one can argue from Supervenience* to the 
following controversial consequence of Adams’s Schema: 
(*) (◇(Obama is president) ⊃ Obama exists). 
Choose some object a such that necessarily, it is not possible for a to be president.  (Given stand-
ard essentialist assumptions there should be many such objects: Adams uses the premiere of 
Beethoven’s 9th symphony.)  By the Necessity Schema, [~◇(a is president)] is necessary, and so 
true at every possible world.   We will argue that [~◇(Obama is president)] is also true at pos5 -
 As Adams and Kment use ‘true at’, p can be true at w even when [p exists] is false at w. On Kment’s analysis, p is 5
true at w iﬀ p is logically entailed by the members of w together with all propositions specifying the membership of 
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sible worlds where neither a nor Obama exist.  Let w be such a world; let pp be the propositions 
true at w that don’t mention Obama or a, together with [Obama doesn’t exist] and [a doesn’t ex-
ist].  Since every proposition is such that either it or its negation is true at w, Supervenience* im-
plies that every proposition or its negation is logically entailed by pp, and hence that every pro-
position true at w is logically entailed by pp.  Since [~◇(a is president)] is true at w, it is logic-
ally entailed by pp.  But recall that logical entailment is a formal relation, preserved by all substi-
tution operations that do not collapse distinct objects to the same object.  Consider the permuta-
tion g on {Obama, a} where g(Obama)=a and g(a)=Obama.  The g-image of any proposition p 
is the result of replacing any occurrences of Obama in p with occurrences of a, and vice versa. 
 By the formality of logical entailment, the g-images of pp logically entail the g-image of [~◇(a 
is president)].  But since propositions that mention neither Obama nor a are their own g-images, 
and [Obama doesn’t exist] and [a doesn’t exist] are one anothers’ g-images, the g-images of pp 
are just pp.  It also seems plausible that the g-image of [~◇(a is president)]) is [~◇(Obama is 
president)].   If so, [~◇(Obama is president)] is logically entailed by pp, and so true at w.  Thus 6
[◇(Obama is president)] is not true at any world where neither [a exists] nor [Obama exists] is 
true.  This means that [◇(Obama is president) → Obama exists or a exists] is necessary; so by 
the Necessity Schema,  
 □(◇(Obama is president) → Obama exists or a exists).  
But given the arbitrariness in the choice of a, accepting this while rejecting (*) is not on the 
cards.  Indeed, by taking a to be something like Obama’s unit set, which couldn’t exist without 
Obama, we can complete the argument for (*).   
It is easy to turn this into an argument for □∀x□(◇(x is president) → x exists), and parallel 
arguments can be given for many other instances of Adams’s Schema where φ(x) is intuitively 
 This conflicts with Atomic Operators, according to which [~◇(Obama is president)] is the negation of an atomic 6
proposition which mentions neither Obama nor a, and is thus its own g-image.  To make room for Atomic Operators, 
one could instead use g+ where g+(Obama)=a, g+(a)=Obama, g+([Obama is president])=[a is president]  and g+([a 
is president])=[Obama is president].  
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“positive”.  However the strategy does not work for “negative” instances like ‘□∀x□(◇~(x is 
president) → x exists)’, since it would require finding an object a such that □~◇~(a is 
president), and there is no reason to believe in such a thing.  Because of this limitation, the argu-
ment poses no obvious threat to schemas like (2–5).  But (*) is still controversial enough, since it 
forces contingentists to reject the B-schema (1). 
This argument has two major weaknesses.  One is its reliance on Supervenience*, which is a 
very strong claim because logical entailment is such a strong relation.  Since many intuitively 
watertight arguments – e.g.  from [There are bachelors] to [There are unmarried men], or even 
from [p is necessary] to [p is possible] – fail to be logical entailments, we lack a strong pre-the-
oretical grip on the contrast between logical entailment and metaphysical necessitation.  So even 
if we grant that something like Supervenience* is true, it is reasonable to demand an argument 
that the truth in the vicinity is Supervenience* itself rather than the analogous principle involving 
metaphysical necessitation in place of logical entailment.  I didn’t find anything in Kment’s ex-
planation of his reasons for Supervenience* (Kment 2013, 82) that looked like it could play this 
discriminating role.  
The second weakness is the assumption that [~◇(Obama is president)] is the g-image of 
[~◇(a is president)], or – equivalently, since that proposition does not mention Obama – the res-
ult of substituting Obama for a in it.  What general principle could justify this?   We might be 
tempted by the following: 
Strong Substitution Schema: [φ(b)] is the result of substituting b for a in [φ(a)]. 
But Kment certainly cannot accept this.  For him, [Hesperus is brighter than Phosphorus] is 
identical to [Venus is brighter than Venus]; substituting Mars for Hesperus in it yields [Mars is 
brighter than Mars], not [Mars is brighter than Phosphorus].  Fortunately, there is an easy restric-
tion that avoids this problem:  
Restricted Substitution Schema: If for some x, [φ(x)] does not mention a, then [φ(b)] is the res-
ult of substituting b for a in [φ(a)]. 
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This gets around the counterexample, since there is no x for which [x is brighter than Phosphor-
us] fails to mention Hesperus.  And since there certainly are objects x for which [◇(x is presid-
ent)] fails to mention a, the Restricted Substitution Schema is still strong enough to support the 
claim that [~◇(Obama is president)] is the result of substituting Obama for a in [~◇(a is pres-
ident)].   
However, the Restricted Substitution Schema is deeply problematic, since it leads to incon-
sistency in conjunction with assumptions at least as plausible as itself.  When x is a name or vari-
able, let ‘R(x)’ abbreviate ‘x is a proposition that mentions some proposition q such that the res-
ult of substituting x for q in x is not true’.   Let s be [snow is white]; let t be [R(s)].  (t is false, 7
since s doesn’t mention any propositions.)  Since the expression abbreviated by ‘R(x)’ contains 
no names or free variables other than x, it seems obvious that there is no proposition mentioned 
by [R(x)] for all x.  So we can invoke the Restricted Substitution Schema to deduce that for any 
propositions p and q, [R(q)] is the result of substituting q for p in [R(p)].  In particular, [R(t)] is 
the result of substituting t for s in t.  But the result of substituting one object for another in any 
proposition mentions everything that proposition mentions, except for the substituted object.  It 
follows that s is the one and only proposition mentioned by t, since any other proposition men-
tioned by t would have to be mentioned by [R(x)] for all x.  So if [R(t)] is true, no proposition q 
mentioned by t is such that the result of substituting t for q in t is not true: in other words, it is not 
the case that R(t).  Meanwhile, if [R(t)] is not true, then there is a proposition mentioned by t – 
namely s – such that the result of substituting t for it in t is not true: in other words, R(t).  So we 
have established the following disjunction: 
Either [R(t)] is true and not R(t), or [R(t)] is not true and R(t).   
And this is inconsistent with the Truth Schema ‘[φ] is true if and only if φ’, a principle which 
seems absolutely basic to our thinking about propositions.     8
 Since ‘R(x)’ is a mere abbreviation, it is irrelevant whether there is a property of being an x such that R(x).  7
 Kment rejects the necessitation of the Truth Schema, but that is a diﬀerent matter.  8
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Of course, the Truth Schema is not beyond all doubt – one might reject it in response to the 
semantic paradoxes, though in my view a better response is to reject disquotation schemas like 
‘“φ” expresses [φ] and nothing else’.  But it is hard to see why anyone who rejected the Truth 
Schema would accept the Necessity Schema, which also played a crucial role in the argument 
from Supervenience* to (*).  So that argument is on shaky ground no matter what.  9
The foregoing argument – essentially a version of the Russell-Myhill paradox (see Goodman 
forthcoming) – shows that ‘structured’ conceptions of propositions like Kment’s are more prob-
lematic than has generally been acknowledged.  While it does not refute the thesis that proposi-
tions are Lagadonian sentences, it undermines many of its applications, by forcing us to reject 
natural generalisations relating the structure of the proposition [φ] to that of the English sentence 
‘φ’.  Somehow, [R(t)] is not the result of substituting t for s in [R(s)].  If we can get used to this, 
why not also deny that [◇(a is president)] is the result of substituting a for Obama in 
[◇(Obama is president)]?    10
I conclude that contingentists have not yet been given a compelling reason to reject schemas 
like (1–5). Nevertheless, the Adams-Kment view is clearly worth taking seriously, and is in some 
ways attractive – there is certainly something disquieting about the way in which the combination 
of contingentism, essentialism and the B-schema requires, as it were, non-existent objects to be 
able to diﬀer modally without any underlying categorical diﬀerences.  And I don’t want to sug-
gest that any of (1–5) are so obviously correct that their failure is a very serious problem in its 
 It is even more obvious that the Necessity Schema stands or falls with the Possibility Schema (see note 2).  And the 9
foregoing argument against the Restricted Substitution Schema can be modified to rely on the Possibility Schema 
rather than the Truth Schema.  Let ‘R*(x)’ abbreviate ‘x mentions some proposition q such that the result of substi-
tuting x for q in x is not possible’.  By the same reasoning as before, the Restricted Substitution Schema yields that 
either [R*(t)] is possible and not R*(t), or [R*(t)] is not possible and R*(t).  But we can also argue that R*(t) iﬀ 
◇R*(t), from the following premise (which Kment would accept): for any p, q, r, s, if ◇(p is possible) then p is 
possible, and if ◇(p mentions q and nothing else) then p mentions q and nothing else, and if ◇(q is the result of 
substituting r for s in t) then q is the result of substituting r for s in t.  We thus arrive at a disjunction ruled out by the 
Possibility Schema: either [R*(t)] is possible and not ◇R*(t) or [R*(t)] is not possible and ◇R*(t).  
 There is a diﬀerent route to the conclusion that the structures of propositions do not match the structures of the 10
sentences that express them, involving plural quantification.  Surprisingly, given that he is so careful to allow for 
singular propositions about proper classes, Kment lacks a theory of “singular propositions about pluralities”.  Given 
standard plural logic, there must be cases where [φ(xx)] = [φ(yy)] even though at least one of xx is not one of yy, for 
any formula φ(xx) with a free plural variable.
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own right.  Claims involving iterated modal operators are notoriously hard to express idiomatic-
ally in natural languages, so it seems perfectly appropriate for our assessment of them to be driv-
en by systematic considerations.  However, I think that there is a serious problem in the vicinity, 
since the considerations that motivate rejecting (1–5) also seem to require rejecting certain or-
dinary judgments involving iterated counterfactuals.  Consider: 
(6)  If Obama had never been born, some unfortunate people who would have voted for Obama 
if he had been on the ballot in 2008 would never have taken part in politics. 
This is perfectly ordinary English, and is plausibly true.   But the motivations for rejecting (1–5) 11
which we have considered seem to carry over to (6).  Anyone who accepted Atomic Operators 
would have just as much reason to identify [If it were that φ then it would be that ψ] with [p 
bears r to q], where p=[φ], q=[ψ] and r is the relation of counterfactual dependence.  Similarly, 
if one identified [□φ] and [◇φ] with propositions picking out [φ] descriptively in terms of its 
constituents, one would have equal reason to identify [If it were that φ then it would be that ψ] 
with some proposition picking out [φ] and [ψ] descriptively in terms of their constituents.  And 
finally, the substitution-theoretic argument for (*) can easily be turned into an argument against 
(6).  Consider something that would not have existed if Obama had never been born – say, 
Obama’s daughter Malia.  Whatever reason there might be to think that [~◇(Obama is presid-
ent)] is the result of substituting Obama for a in [~◇(a is president)], there is equally good reas-
on to think that [Some unfortunate people who would have voted for Malia if she had been on the 
ballot in 2008 never take part in the political process] is the result of substituting Malia for 
Obama in [Some unfortunate people who would have voted for Obama if he had been on the bal-
lot in 2008 never take part in the political process].  But Supervenience* implies that proposi-
tions that interchange two objects always agree at worlds where neither object exists, so that if 
(6) is true, (7) is also true: 
 The reading of (6) I have in mind is the one where the quantifier takes scope under the conditional, so that it is 11
consistent with there not being any unfortunate people.  
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(7) If Obama had never been born, some unfortunate people who would have voted for Malia if 
she had been on the ballot in 2008 would never have taken part in the political process. 
But this is bad news: Malia was only ten years old in 2008, so (7) is much less likely to be true 
than (6) is.    12
Adams’s and Kment’s combination of contingentism with Adams’s Schema is thus far more 
deeply at odds with ordinary thought then they recognize.  If there were a compelling argument 
for Adams’s Schema, this would be bad news for contingentism.  But as we have seen, the extant 
arguments are quite problematic.  So for now, the biggest challenges for contingentists lie else-
where.   
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